Military
Decline

What impact does democratic government have on the military's ability to exercise decisive influence over issues of broad social and political significance? Are electoral politicians under democracy likely to preserve or diminish the military's sphere of involvement? What resources can and will the armed forces deploy to defend and advance their claims?

This chapter discusses competing theoretical approaches that claim to provide answers to these questions. The first section presents and probes the central analytic issue of the book: whether and for how long the "pacted" or negotiated nature of the transition to democracy in Brazil inhibited democracy's consolidation. Did the military governments' firm guidance of the transition, which allowed the armed forces to maintain ample institutional powers and play an influential political role in the initial phase of the new regime, create a legacy of extensive military influence? Or did the rules and norms of democracy eventually lead elected civilians to rein in the political activities of the military? The framework I present and endorse in this section suggests that the competitive dynamic of democracy unleashes irresistible incentives for civilian politicians to contest a military prone to political interference and endowed with ample institutional prerogatives, and that the popular support certified by electoral victory enhances their capacity to do so.

The second section examines and analyzes the effect of two conditioning factors—civilian political institutions and broader power alignments—in shaping the strategies of democratically elected political actors to extend their power and influence over the military. I argue that the weak institutionalization of Brazil's political system and multiple constraints on the use of military force for domestic political purposes in the current era reinforce the pressures created by democratic competition to reduce military influence.

While recognizing that the definition of democracy is a subject of intense debate, I conceptualize democracy as a system of governance in which an inclusive adult population is free to engage in individual and collective forms of political action and in which rulers are selected through open, competitive, peaceful, and regularly scheduled elections. This is similar to what Robert Dahl calls "polyarchy." Such a minimalist, formal-procedural definition of democracy is necessary because I seek to investigate the impact that democratic procedures have on a substantive issue (the influence of the military in politics). My study would be condemned to uncovering a tautology if it included in the definition of democracy the absence of interference by unelected officials, such as military officers.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN POSTAUTHORITARIAN BRAZIL: CONTINUITY VERSUS CHANGE?

"Confining Conditions" Inhibit Civilian Sovereignty

Many analysts, including Alfred Stepan, Frances Hagopian, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Terry Karl, posited that Brazilian democracy would suffer from a serious "birth defect." They claimed that the negotiated nature of the transition to civilian rule would provide the military, along with other important actors from the authoritarian period, with long-lasting political clout. More specifically, they contended that institutional privileges the armed forces retained in the transition process would give them a strong and indefinite foundation of political leverage. The military would be able to exercise undue influence in nonmilitary spheres as well as resist civilian direction over defense issues. The concern of these authors was not that the armed forces would launch a frontal assault on democracy by waging a coup d'état, but that they would impede democratic consolidation by continual tutelage, causing democracy to die a "slow death." In line with the view that "patterns of politics established in periods of transition have a very real and strong potential to become semipermanent features of the political landscape," Hagopian contends, "[t]he advent of civilian rule in Brazil did not erode military authority, though it may have disguised it." O'Donnell saw Brazil as vulnerable to the development of a democradura, a civilian government controlled by military and authoritarian elements. The considerable political interference of the army in the first three years of the civilian regime seemed to provide empirical verification for this theoretical expectation.

Tenets of "historical institutionalism" informed the development of this rather pessimistic view. The influence of branching tree models, such as Krasner's model of "punctuated equilibrium," is particularly observable. These models claim that stable institutional patterns structure political life. By creating vested interests that promote their own persistence, institutions gain considerable autonomy and strength to withstand shifts in the broader political and socioeconomic environment. Even a challenge drastic enough to upset established institutional patterns is conditioned in its impact by the institutional setting in which it occurs. Historical institutionalists therefore view political development as a path-dependent process: following one path channels further development down the same path and precludes other options.

According to this view, significant political change only takes place at "critical junctures" or "turning points," when institutional patterns are challenged by strong socioeconomic or political pressures. Such moments present rare opportunities for political actors to reshape the political landscape by founding new institutions. Periods of regime transition—when the rules of the game are in flux— constitute such moments. If change is to occur, quick action must be taken before the transition period comes to a close and patterns and practices inherited from the previous regime have a chance to congeal. After these windows of opportunity close, stability prevails and profound political change, which would reshape the institutional framework, is unlikely. If left unchallenged during the regime change, previous institutional patterns are believed to be reaffirmed and given a strong foundation to persist. A historical institutionalist perspective would predict that the armed forces would be able to preserve their power and set limits to popular sovereignty in the new democracy if they and other conservative elites managed to retain strong institutional prerogatives throughout a transition from authoritarian rule.

Electoral Competition Leads Civilians to Contest the Military

In contrast to the view described above, my research on postauthoritarian Brazil suggests that countries that return to civilian rule through elite-led negotiations need not be constrained indefinitely by the balance of forces that prevailed in the transition and immediate posttransition period. Civil-military relations in postauthoritarian Brazil have displayed much greater dynamism than a historical-institutionalist framework can account for. The firm hand the armed forces exercised over the transition and the institutional prerogatives they retained did strengthen their political clout in the immediate aftermath of the transition. The army's interference in civilian decision making was considerable and often met with success in this initial period. But as the authoritarian past receded further into the distance, the advantage that military elites could reap from factors stemming from the transition began to erode. Within roughly three years, elected officials began to take gradual yet significant steps to check the military's political interference. Politicians first confronted the military over issues that directly affected their popularity and electoral standing. Later, their actions included efforts to diminish the military's institutional basis for political involvement, for example, by forming civilian-led organs to replace the former National Security Council (Conselho de Segurança Nacional or CSN) and the National Information Service (Serviço Nacional de Informações or SNI). At the same time, while some of the military's institutional prerogatives remained in existence, leading officers appeared increasingly unable to use them to wield actual political influence.

How do I explain this unanticipated result? I argue that electoral competition creates incentives for politicians to reduce the interference of a politically powerful and active military, and that electoral victory enhances their capacity to do so. This claim rests on two premises: that politicians are first and foremost interested in their own political survival, and that the broad institutional context in which they operate structures their behavior. These premises suggest that politicians will contest the military when military actions conflict with politicians' opportunity to gain widespread electoral appeal. Thus, in contrast to the view that political arrangements that are founded or reaffirmed during regime transitions will remain entrenched even as the political landscape around them changes, I contend that broad political and institutional shifts—in this case, the unfolding of the rules and norms of democracy—can disrupt patterns and practices put in place under a different set of circumstances. Rather than creating a static framework, democracy unleashes a competitive dynamic conducive to change.

This analysis is inspired by the literature on rational choice, which focuses on actors and their intentions and explains political action with reference to rational interest calculation. Strategic interaction among individuals maximizing their self-interest is seen as the foundation of politics. In the rational choice perspective, institutions result from this kind of interaction among individuals; they are created by actors pursuing their own preferences in instrumental ways. Once established, institutions set parameters for individual actors and their interest calculations, but they are always open to further modification.

These are the explicit premises of arguments that authors such as Barry Ames and Barbara Geddes advance to explain politics and institutional change in Latin America. These ideas are also reflected in Douglas Chalmers's concept of the "politicized state," which differs fundamentally from Krasner's model of "punctuated equilibrium." Whereas Krasner stresses the stickiness of institutions and confines the possibility of change to rare but major moments of reorientation, such as regime transitions, Chalmers emphasizes the ever-present fluidity of Latin American politics, marked by frequent incremental shifts in the balance of power among self-interested actors and the institutional arrangements they establish.

Both historical institutionalism and rational choice focus on the relationship between actors and institutions but differ in their views concerning the malleability of institutions and the direction of the causal relationship between actors and institutions. Historical institutionalism sees institutional arrangements as resistant to change, except during rare crises, and focuses on the constraints that institutions impose on actors. By contrast, rational choice sees institutions as more mutable and underscores the capacity of actors to shape institutions and modify them once they are created. Rational choice theorists recognize that actors are conditioned by their institutional setting, which establishes a strategic context for decision making, but hasten to emphasize that this framework itself is the product of interaction among self-interested individuals.

Insofar as my empirical findings show that self-interested actors began rather quickly to reshape institutional arrangements and to alter the balance of political power in their favor, my study bears out the guiding principles of rational choice and diverges from those of historical institutionalism. The rules of democracy in Brazil have fostered political competition and thus induced and enabled politicians to undermine the terms of the conservative pact made during the transition from authoritarianism. In particular, politicians have begun to remove important constraints on popular sovereignty by contesting the institutional prerogatives of the military and reducing their political influence.

Political Incentives

What, more specifically, are the factors that induce and enable civilian politicians to undermine military tutelage over the new democracy? Why do many efforts by politicians to enhance their electoral chances conflict with positions the armed forces hold? And how do politicians gain the force to advance their preferences even against opposition from the armed forces?

Democratization gives rise to two types of incentives for electoral politicians: particularistic and programmatic. Particularistic incentives concern the use of resources to build and maintain politicians' personal support networks. Programmatic incentives involve the credit given to politicians for advances in public policy (e.g., health, education, welfare, and economic reform). Both types of incentives are operative in Brazil, as in most democracies. And in different ways both generate strong and specific pressures against the persistence of military involvement in politics.

First, democratization in Brazil has reinforced particularistic incentives associated with political clientelism, often at the armed forces' expense. Heightened electoral competition since the early 1980s has motivated politicians to search ever more energetically for economic assets to distribute as political pork barrel, thereby improving their chances of reelection. The dream of clientelist politicians is to build roads, schools, hospitals, sanitation systems, and other public works projects in their electoral districts. These benefits are targeted toward specific, regionally delimited groups of people. The extent to which legislators support local pork barrel projects, and the prevalence of logrolling in congressional voting patterns, strongly suggest that many Brazilians still vote largely with considerations of patronage in mind, or at least that politicians think they do.

Beyond seeking to distribute particularistic patronage, politicians also pursue "categorical patronage." Such benefits are targeted to specific industries and/or categories of people. In principle, benefits are defined in general terms, but the beneficiaries unfailingly "happen" to be concentrated regionally. The rather narrow and regionally concentrated nature of the given categories qualifies these benefits as patronage and not as an integral part of programmatic strategies. The purpose of providing categorical patronage is for politicians to win regionally based electoral support, not to advance universalist goals. Examples of categorical patronage include subsidies for Brazil's sugar alcohol program and coffee sector, and social security provisions for specific types of workers and pensioners, especially those who are concentrated in the country's most developed regions.

The rampant pursuit of patronage resources by politicians not only clashes with the long-standing positivist impulse within the military to "rationalize" the public bureaucracy. It also leads them to enter into direct competition with military elites over state resources. Politicians are tempted to shift budget shares away from the military to civilian ministries better suited for pork barrel. Similarly, where military officers hold key posts in large state enterprises—strategic positions from which to build political allies by distributing jobs and other benefits—patronage-seeking politicians will seek to replace them. The competition for patronage resources unleashed by democratic competition thus generates strong pressures against the continued entrenchment of the military in the political and economic fabric of the country.

Second, in addition to unleashing particularistic incentives associated with political clientelism, democratization reinforces programmatic incentives that frequently work against the armed forces. In Brazil, winning elections often depends on gaining the votes of the country's impoverished yet increasingly mobilized majority. Besides seeking to rise from their own poverty, some of Brazil's poor have visions, albeit often vaguely defined, of a more egalitarian society. Politicians of diverse ideological leanings suggest increasingly in their conduct that they feel pressured to respond to this pool of voters in a symbolic, if not effective, way. This is especially true of politicians who need to appeal to urban electorates; they would quickly be turned out if they merely defended the interests of the privileged. Politicians tend to portray themselves as sympathetic with the plight of the country's poor, despite the deeply conservative tendencies of Brazilian politics. They do so in rhetorical ways; for example, the successor of the government party during military rule, ARENA (the National Renovating Alliance or Aliança de Renovação Nacional), renamed itself the Democratic-Social Party (Partido Democrático Social or PDS). Similarly, Brazilian politicians frequently make reference to mudança (change) and to a novo Brasil (new Brazil). They also try to gain standing with the mass citizenry by supporting policies that recognize popular desires for change, at least in some highly visible areas, such as labor legislation. Insofar as many of the policies that (even conservative) politicians are tempted to support in order to appear progressive do not ensure universal social rights or effective interest representation for the disadvantaged, they are more "populist" than "programmatic" in nature. Nevertheless, they often run counter to the military's goal of maintaining social order through restrictions on popular mobilization. The military's ultimate fear is that politicians with populist leanings will encourage Brazil's historically quiescent lower classes to become more assertive, thereby jeopardizing political stability and a model of accumulation propitious for Brazil's rapid economic advancement.

In addition to unleashing "populist" tendencies, democracy makes politicians accountable for the success of more strictly programmatic policies. These include social reforms as well as economic measures like privatization, stabilization, and adjustment. Given the importance of performance for public support, politicians seek maximum control over events and processes that occur within their jurisdiction, territorial and functionally Large bureaucratic organizations like the military can compromise this latitude. And unlike alliances with other established groups and institutions, close relations with the armed services rarely enhance a politician's electoral chances. While Brazilian legislators clearly rely less on taking policy stands and more on providing particularistic services, Brazilian presidents depend on enacting public policies that meet the public's approval. They are thus especially concerned with maintaining political autonomy from groups that could interfere with this goal. The constitution bans immediate presidential reelection, but former Brazilian presidents often reenter politics at lower levels. They can also compete for the presidency again after one term has lapsed.

These seeds of conflict that democracy plants between civilian and military interests create strong pressures for elected politicians to reduce the military's sphere of influence. This does not mean that ideology is irrelevant or that all politicians will follow this course of action all of the time. But at the very least the framework presented here suggests that conflict will invariably develop between electoral politicians and soldiers, and that the survival interests of politicians are sufficiently compelling to prompt efforts to contract the military's domain over time.

Political Capacity

If electoral competition unleashes incentives for politicians to diminish military influence, the popular support that electoral victory certifies enhances the capacity of politicians to do so. A military organization would incur great risk and cost in taking forceful measures against a government with solid popular backing. The greater the mandate a given government enjoys, the less likely military elites will be to aggressively counteract civilian attempts to diminish their political role. All things being equal, a politician's capacity to take measures prejudicial to the armed forces is also enhanced to the extent that the armed forces do not form a united front opposing the measures in question.

In Brazil, capturing 53 percent of the valid vote in the 1989 presidential election (the first direct presidential election in twenty-nine years) helped President Fernando Collor face down the armed forces in the initial stages of his government. Concrete policies to narrow the military's sphere of influence, as well as symbolic gestures such as Collor's frequent references to himself as "commander in chief," met with little resistance. A poll conducted in the spring of 1991, which revealed the three military ministers to be among the least known of anyone in the cabinet, attested to Collor's ability to defuse the military. Rarely did Collor appear at public events alongside his military ministers, a sure sign that the armed forces had lost their place in the inner circle of power.

By contrast, Collor's predecessor, President José Sarney (1985-90), was far more beholden to the armed forces. The military ministers, especially Army Minister Leônidas Pires Gonçalves, were featured regularly in the press commenting on wide-ranging topics and criticizing civilian authorities. Sarney was the rather colorless vice presidential running mate of president-elect Tancredo Neves, who died in 1985 shortly before assuming office. Neves himself was selected by an electoral college rather than by popular vote. The weakness of Sarney's mandate—beginning with the nonelectoral route by which he came to power—deprived him of the necessary authority to stand strong against the military. Notably, however, even President Sarney made some modest efforts to contain the military in the initial stages of his government. These efforts took place at roughly the same time that Sarney pursued a populist line on economic policy. But after his popularity plunged beginning in December 1986 with the failure of the Cruzado Plan, an economic stabilization plan intended to break inertial inflation, President Sarney became captive to the armed forces.

President Itamar Franco suffered from the same basic weakness as President Sarney. Replacing President Collor in the wake of the December 1992 vote of impeachment, former vice president Franco did not come to power with an electoral mandate of his own. Moreover, during his presidency Franco never gained sufficient popularity among the citizenry to defy any established group or organization. President Franco therefore manifested much greater timidity than his predecessor in taking steps to increase civilian dominance.

The dynamic described above suggests that civilian politicians will be motivated to oppose a politically active military as a natural outgrowth of democratization. Even in the absence of a deliberate, principle-driven strategy to remove the military from political roles, the imperatives of electoral competition, together with the legitimation that popular elections confer on winning candidates, set the stage for civil-military conflict and the subsequent adoption of measures to reduce the military's sphere of influence. Some politicians who support the reduction of military prerogatives undoubtedly do embrace the ideal of civilian control over the military. Many, however, appear to be motivated less by principles and more by instrumental considerations of electoral advancement. That former members of ARENA, the government party under authoritarian rule, have been among those who have contested the armed forces attests to the strength of pragmatic calculations. President Collor himself, who launched the most direct attack on the armed forces since 1985, was himself a son of the military regime.

Presidents versus Legislators: Differences in Incentives and Capacities

Both presidents and legislators seek to extend their own power and influence. A military that interferes regularly in politics will invariably constitute an impediment to this goal. The more the armed forces impinge on the electoral interests of executive and legislative politicians, the more they set themselves up to be contested. Beyond the basic interest that presidents and legislators share in their own electoral advancement, a slightly different set of incentives and constraints applies to the two categories of politicians.

Presidents seek to remain in good standing with the electorate even though most Latin American countries bar immediate presidential reelection. In many countries, it is not unusual for former presidents to strive for the presidency anew after sitting out one or more terms. In Brazil, they often seek election to lower political offices. To maximize their long-term influence and chances of reelection, presidents must do three things: govern effectively, build a political organization with strong personal loyalties to them, and survive in power. The presence of a powerful and politically active military can pose a threat to all three of these objectives. A military prone to political meddling is an especially vexing problem for presidents.

The future careers of presidents, more than those of legislators, depend on achieving programmatic goals that resonate well with public opinion. If reelection is at all a goal, presidents must gather cross-regional support. The programmatic incentives facing presidents include a host of public-policy initiatives over which military influence could be problematic and electorally costly. The following constitutes an example of military interference limiting a president's latitude to enact reforms that could boost his government's popularity. The hierarchy's relentless pressure on the Franco government to award higher salaries to the military (which, if granted, would compel the government to provide salary increases for civilian public employees as well) threatened the austerity requirement of the Franco government's economic plan, the Plano Real. President Franco had a vested interest in the plan, an eleventh-hour development that could improve the reputation of his beleaguered government. The success of the plan was also critical to Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who used it to launch his campaign for the presidency.

While more attentive than legislators to broader policy concerns, presidents also need to build and finance personal support networks. They rely on the distribution of large-scale patronage to win support for their programs in the Congress and bureaucracy, and among governors and mayors. Presidents' reliance on patronage is also designed to lay the groundwork for future political candidacies to which they aspire. Thus, presidents too face pressure to direct public funds to where they have the greatest electoral payoff. Having to spend patronage resources on the armed forces in order to ward off the prospect of a coup interferes with this goal. When threatened with imminent military intervention, Latin American presidents have historically redirected vast amounts of patronage resources to the armed forces. But this leaves them with fewer resources to finance social and economic programs essential for maintaining general popularity and legislative support.

In short, through policies as well as electoral patronage, presidents can enhance their long-term influence and subsequent reelection. A politically inclined military is likely to interfere in the dual processes of policy making and patronage distribution. It thus stands to reason that presidents would be motivated to contest the military and push them back from the political sphere. Moreover, by virtue of the impressive administrative powers that Latin American presidents have at their disposal, their ability to enact reforms to contract military influence greatly exceeds that of individual legislators.

But the aspiration of Latin American presidents to contain military influence in order to advance their electoral interests is often counterbalanced by the desire to survive in office. Antagonizing the military remains a widespread concern among Latin American presidents. In the event of a military coup, a prospect that occurs to all Latin American chief executives at one time or another, the president is usually the main target of overthrow. In the decades before the installation of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime of 1964-85, the military spearheaded several "moderating coups," whose central purpose was to replace one civilian executive by another.

Presidents can be counted on to court the military—even at the cost of political autonomy—when deep economic and political crises put in doubt the survival of their governments. Discretionary funding and other concessions to the armed services are key ways by which debilitated presidents try to secure their governments. Obtaining military support has two objectives: the first is to reduce the likelihood that the armed forces will try to overthrow the government; the second is to enhance governability by fortifying the government. For example, a president who enjoys military backing is better positioned than one who does not to intimidate an uncooperative Congress or an unruly labor movement into becoming more supportive (or at least less defiant) of his administration.

In short, while the desire to extend their own power and influence constitutes a strong motivation for presidents to contest and contain the military, the instinct to protect themselves from overthrow also exists, constituting a countervailing source of pressure. Given the extensive powers of their office, Latin American presidents can affect decisively the civil-military balance depending on which logic and corresponding course of action they follow. As discussed below, in addition to a president's electoral mandate, broader power alignments and the overall political climate can tip the balance in one direction or the other.

Legislators are also constrained by the presence of a powerful and politically active military. In order to improve their chances of reelection, they too want to extend their own control over resources and broaden their latitude over decision making. Compared to executive politicians, however, electoral support for legislators depends less on what programs they support and more on their ability to satisfy constituents through the provision of particularistic services and categorical patronage. As a general rule, the broader policy concerns of legislators will be more important to urban constituencies, who are better informed and more mobilized than their rural counterparts. But even in states with major urban agglomerations, such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais, the provision of categorical patronage is important to getting elected. As individuals, legislators can only gain by doling out huge amounts of patronage. Presidents, by contrast, bear a disproportionate burden for relying excessively on patronage for electoral ends. For a president, the costs of pursuing such a policy range from antagonizing the military to ruining the economy.

Legislators also have a strong interest in not antagonizing the military. But a collective action dilemma, which the organizational weakness and fragmentation of Brazil's political party system exacerbates, often prevents them from supporting budgetary and other policies that reflect this interest. For example, legislators cannot be assured that fellow members would contribute to the collective good of safeguarding democracy by satisfying the military's budgetary demands. The moderation of an individual legislator's hunger for patronage resources would barely affect the armed forces' budget share. But by sacrificing patronage, a crucial weapon in electoral competition, the individual politician might risk his or her political future. Thus, the incentive structure militates against an individual legislator's making a contribution to this cause on his or her own. This suggests that the Congress might be the most likely institution to impose political and organizational costs, as well as budgetary restrictions, on the armed forces. The fact that military reprisal is generally directed more clearly at presidents than legislators reinforces this expectation.

The Brazilian Congress has indeed taken bold steps to challenge military power. But Congress's ability to enact reforms aimed at subordinating the military to effective civilian control in the long term hinges on acquiring collective support. Gathering support to promote the common goal of establishing civilian supremacy over the military is difficult where legislators direct their time, energy, and political capital to issues that yield more concrete and immediate political benefit. In short, the problem is that, as individuals, presidents have the greatest capacity to downgrade the military's institutional powers, but they are often inhibited by fear; legislators are less concerned than presidents about antagonizing the military but face greater organizational barriers to bringing about reforms that would advance civilian authority in the long term. Yet despite these constraints, political elites in postauthoritarian Brazil have in fact challenged the military over specific policy decisions as well as certain institutional prerogatives.

While democracy provides universal inducements to pushing back military influence, the strength of the incentives and the capacity of politicians to act on them vary across time and across countries. Institutional differences—for example, electoral rules and internal party procedures that shape politicians' strategies for electoral advancement—explain some of the variation among democratic countries. So do broad domestic and international changes that affect the degree to which politicians view military restiveness as a serious threat. As elaborated below, both factors—institutional differences among politics and broader power alignments in society—condition the process by which civilians contest the military. While the weakly institutionalized nature of Brazilian politics heightens the incentives for political elites to contest the armed forces, the lack of domestic and international support for military intervention in the post-cold war era removes a previous disincentive. Together, they render politicians more likely to push back military influence.

CONDITIONING FACTORS

Institutional Rules

Institutional rules condition politicians' strategies for pursuing reelection, which in turn shape their conduct toward the military. The system of government (presidentialism versus parliamentarism), rules governing elections, the party system, and internal party procedures have an important impact on these strategies. Brazil's political system contains numerous features that impel politicians to act in accordance with electoral exigencies. Under the short time horizons that this system encourages, politicians are especially motivated to adopt policies that impose organizational, political, and budgetary costs on the armed forces.

Comparatively speaking, Brazilian politics is highly personalistic and weakly institutionalized. The party system is extremely fragmented. Parties themselves lack internal cohesion. The 1989 presidential race provided strong testimony to the weakness of party affiliation and the negligible role that parties play in structuring Brazilian politics. Fernando Collor de Mello created a new party, the PRN (Partido de Reconstrução Nacional or National Reconstruction Party), for the sole purpose of running for president. The runner up, Luis Inácio (Lula) da Silva, came from the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT), whose representatives comprised a mere 3 percent of the Congress.

Several institutional provisions elevate the importance of personalistic leadership and populist appeals. Presidentialism, coupled with a fractionalized multiparty system, is a foundation for highly candidate-centered politics. The independent basis of power that presidents enjoy allows them (more than prime ministers) to circumvent parties. And because a multiparty system creates special difficulties for the creation of stable majorities, presidents facing this situation are especially likely to try to govern above parties.

The unique combination of proportional representation and open-list candidate selection gives Brazilian parties limited influence over which candidates are elected. Because candidates effectively compete against members of their own party (as well as other parties), open-list proportional representation systems place a high premium on a candidate's personal characteristics (rather than his or her links to a political party) and on a candidate's ability to dole out patronage.

Further weakening the strength of Brazilian parties is the absence of an entry barrier to the formation of a political party (a certain minimum percentage of the national vote that parties must obtain in order to win representation in the legislature). Brazilian politicians thus form new parties when it is opportune to do so, and because no legislation prohibits it, they frequently leave their old parties for other already established parties. Between 1987 and 1990, 40 percent of all federal deputies switched parties, mainly during the Constituent Assembly of 1987-88. Given the electoral importance of patronage, it is not uncommon for legislators to join and abandon given parties based on party connections to clientelist networks, especially those sustained by the government. Many politicians previously of ARENA have switched into centrist or even somewhat progressive parties, mainly to improve their electoral prospects.

It should not be surprising that levels of party identification and loyalty among voters are extremely low in such a system. Because most Brazilian parties have no "reservoir of support" among their followers, politicians are beholden to rank and file demands. The conditional nature of the electorate's support and the high electoral volatility present in weak and fragmented party systems make politicians especially sensitive to immediate electoral considerations.

The ultimate result of Brazil's weak party system is the personalization of politics. Such a system renders the political landscape ripe for the emergence of populist leaders. Prone to demagoguery, they appeal to voters on the basis of diffuse popular images and political patronage. The fluid nature of Brazilian politics and the nonprogrammatic orientation of political parties not only provide politicians with incentives to behave this way, but also offer them great latitude to endorse political platforms in response to shifting public opinion. The weak institutionalization of Brazilian politics selects for those politicians who shun institutional constraints on their rule, whether these constraints assume the form of a stronger party system or a military that is embedded in the state and armed with a broad array of institutional prerogatives.

There is a double edge, however, to the organizational characteristics of the Brazilian political system and their effect on civil-military relations. In weakly institutionalized systems, civilians are more likely to support policies that effectively lead them to challenge the military. When electoral opinion and military preferences come into conflict, politicians are likely to side with the former since few politicians enjoy the reservoir of support that would allow them to act otherwise. But at the same time, politicians in such a system are less likely to build collective support for measures aimed at institutionalizing civilian control over the armed forces. In other words, while the system's fluidity creates special incentives for politicians to contest or challenge the military when their electoral fortunes are at stake, the organizational weakness of political parties militates against efforts to permanently defuse the armed forces as a political actor. The reason for this is twofold.

First, the fragmentation of political parties and the short time horizons of actors in a weakly institutionalized political system create an environment of imediatismo político (political immediatism), which makes it difficult to translate the long-term collective interest in gaining civilian supremacy into collective action of the kind necessary to develop lasting mechanisms of civilian control over the military. Stronger parties, more suitable for overcoming collective-action dilemmas, would help coordinate members around a more deliberate and persistent strategy of gaining civilian control over the military. A less politicized system would enable politicians to look beyond the most immediate crisis and focus their attention on the development of legislation aimed at solving the problem of military interference in a more enduring fashion.

The second general factor limiting a weakly institutionalized political system from going beyond contesting the military to subordinating them permanently concerns the broader impact of such a system on governability. The short-sighted political calculations that drive the actions of clientelist and populist politicians against the military are likely to undermine other goals, such as responsible economic policy. As the economy deteriorates and political turmoil arises, the standing of civilian politicians, most notably the president, is undermined. When these problems erupt into acute crises, presidents, who are held most accountable for the overall condition of the country, risk losing their positions. Under this threat, and because they lack organized bases of civilian support, the capacity of presidents to keep the military out of politics diminishes. They may even turn to and expand the role of the armed forces in order to keep the crisis from spiraling out of control. Thus, the goal to survive in office may eventually induce politicians under threat to restore military power.

Notwithstanding this possibility, military influence has declined overall since 1985 and can be expected to diminish further as Brazilian democracy becomes more consolidated. The dynamic normally unleashed by democratic competition and reinforced by the fluidity of Brazil's political system is for self-interested politicians to contest the military. The countervailing dynamic described above unfolds only under exceptional conditions, stalling or temporarily arresting this process. The dynamic that has transpired in Brazil in the postauthoritarian period suggests that military interference in politics will decline overall with time, notwithstanding certain short-term deviations from this trend. But because the characteristics of a weakly institutionalized system will motivate civilian politicians to continuously challenge the armed forces but not go further and institutionalize control over them, ongoing civil-military tension and conflict can be expected.

The Credibility of Military Force

If characteristics of Brazil's political system strengthen the incentives that lead politicians to contest the military, features particular to the current era and their effect on power relations in the broader society reinforce this tendency. Politicians need to respond to electoral incentives in a democracy, but they must also respond to power relations, which vary across time and national borders. Since basic threats to the socioeconomic and political order are absent in most of post-cold war Latin America, the use of military force for domestic political purposes lacks widespread support and renders civilian politicians less fearful of upsetting the military. The awareness of Brazilian officers that the current political climate is unsympathetic to strong-arm tactics tames their reactions to challenges that they view unfavorably but that do not threaten core corporate interests. Rarely in recent years have the military closed ranks and frontally resisted civilian initiatives to diminish their influence over extramilitary matters. The navy and air force have tended to be more liberal and internationalist, more concerned than the army is to meet narrower professionalist and technological needs and less inclined to combat developments that diminish their overall clout. Even within the army, not all officers have supported a continuation of the institutions influence over broad political, social, and economic questions. Officers' tendency to exercise restraint emboldens politicians to respond more to public opinion than to military opinion. In short, electoral considerations gain in importance and take precedence over considerations of military power when the basic political and economic order is not in question. In the 1990s, winning votes, not military support, is clearly the first principle of political survival.

The basic analytical issue at hand concerns whether and to what extent the armed forces can transform their central power capability—organized coercion— into influence over outcomes. The potential impact of an actor's central power capability (e.g., financial strength, expertise, force, etc.) is a key determinant of how seriously it is regarded by others. It is indeed the case that an actor's potential power is "the price of admission to the political arena," even though the armed forces' institutional prerogatives may help them articulate and realize their preferences without having to constantly invoke their ultimate weapon, the capacity for physical intimidation.

Organized coercion, the military's central power capability, can be an impressive political weapon. A wide range of military actions—from "shows of force" to pronunciamentos, rebellions, and coups d'état—rest on the military's potential to inflict violence. The coup d'état represents perhaps the most outstanding instance of this. Stated starkly by Samuel Huntington, "while other social forces can pressure the government, the military can replace the government."

But the distinction between an actor's potential strength and how likely it is to bring the full force of its power to bear is also critical. Rarely is there a perfect congruence between power as measured by basic capabilities and power as measured by actual effects. Power is not a static attribute, but one that is conditioned by context. Some contexts increase the likelihood and capacity of political actors to transform their potential power into actual influence over outcomes. Others reduce them. When viewed from this perspective, the military's central power capability—organized force—suffers numerous restrictions.

The degree of political influence the armed forces can wield by virtue of their coercive potential depends very much on how willing they are to employ force and, relatedly, on other actors' perceptions of how likely they are to do so. Force can prevail and the military can constitute the ultima ratio if military leaders are willing to assume the costs of unleashing it. Rule by the military as an institution constitutes the clearest expression of the military's willingness to incur the risks of coercive action. Lesser manifestations of military power also carry risks.

The armed forces can indeed overplay their cards by invoking coercion when they lack societal support. Excessive threats and displays of force can erode the reserve of societal good will that the armed forces need to retain long-term credibility. In the words of Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, "beyond a certain point, kicking or even pounding the table may be counterproductive. It threatens one's allies almost as much as one's opponents, and the committed players may well join forces to eliminate the obstreperous one."

Many South American militaries, including (perhaps especially) the Brazilian, strive to project an image of respect for the public's wishes. Never have the Brazilian armed forces undertaken a major intervention without first seeking civilian support. History has demonstrated the value of civilian allies as a key determinant of the success of military interventions. Even during the height of military rule, the regime went to great lengths to legitimate itself by publicizing its developmental accomplishments and keeping the Congress open (at least in a formal sense). In the postauthoritarian period, the energy the Brazilian army devotes to public relations provides strong testimony to its commitment to projecting an image of responsiveness to public sentiment. If the military's claim to represent "the national interest" or "the will of the people" is to have any credence, intimidation must be used selectively. If the armed forces do not reserve saber rattling for exceptional circumstances, their chances of gaining domestic and international civilian support at critical moments will be reduced. In the absence of substantial societal backing, the use of strong-arm tactics for domestic political purposes can also adversely affect corporate unity, a key military concern. Recent examples of this took place in Venezuela and Thailand, where military commanders ordered soldiers to fire on demonstrators in 1989 and 1992, respectively, provoking internal division.

At various moments, the armed forces in Latin America have chosen to assume the risks of using coercion for domestic political purposes. Over the course of this century, Brazil's military have wielded force in various forms and degrees. Two factors have generally inspired their forceful intervention in politics: strong objections to the extant economic and political order, accompanied by a vision of change; and core corporate concerns, such as unity among the officer corps, obedience to hierarchy (especially between officers and enlisted men), autonomy of the rank and seniority system from political interference, a monopoly of the armed forces over paramilitary organizations, and budgetary resources sufficient to maintain training, education, and equipment.

Developments of the early 1960s constituted a challenge to core corporate principles as well as the military's preferred political and economic order. Labor organizers' efforts to unionize enlisted men and President Goulart's pardon of mutinous sailors put in question the military's corporate preservation. The mobilization of urban and rural popular sectors raised concerns among military officers as well as societal elites about maintaining their privileged socioeconomic positions. The political polarization of the 1960s rendered the domestic use of military force more acceptable and lent credibility to military saber rattling. Conservative and center-right politicians allied with leading officers although it diminished their political independence. Under conditions of high politicization, even populist politicians with ample popular backing could be overthrown by the armed forces.

Does postauthoritarian Brazil present conditions similar to those that led the military to rattle their swords, gain the backing of societal elites, and intimidate civilian politicians in the past? By and large it does not. The demobilization of the anti-system left, the demise of communism worldwide, and the general consensus about democracy and capitalism as preferred political and economic systems have calmed the military and other elites. The armed forces' survival is not currently in question. Since the return to civilian rule, the Brazilian military have experienced no fundamental challenges, such as the existence of a parallel armed institution or the operation of subversive groups seeking to undermine internal discipline.

Certain trends, such as the decrease in defense expenditures and the privatization of military industries, have adversely affected force levels, military training, and re-equipment plans. And certainly the military do resist moves to reduce their influence in some areas more than others. For example, they made no concerted effort to retain control over the SNI, but have challenged civilians over budgetary expenditures and defense projects in the Amazon. The variation of military response rests on how closely the issue impinges on central corporate functions, on the (self-defined) raison d'être of the institution, and on the organization's ability to justify itself to others. With reference to the above examples, spying on citizens of one's own country is not easily justifiable as a corporate military function. Demanding greater resources to defend territorial integrity in the Amazon is. Many recent developments that contract the military's jurisdiction and competence and meet with resistance do not strike at the heart of corporate preservation. Thus, they have not prompted leading officers to go beyond routine complaining and the occasional issuing of rhetorical warnings.

Only with respect to one matter—the legal prosecution of military personnel for human rights violations committed in the authoritarian period—have Southern Cone militaries considered the stakes high enough to warrant forceful action. The issue of corporate autonomy lies at the heart of the armed forces' visceral reaction to efforts by civilians to prosecute them for measures conducted in a context they liken to war. Rebellious factions of the Argentine army reminded civilians that they constituted a power to be reckoned with, effectively putting an end to the trials initiated by President Alfonsín. In Chile, where the military have essentially remained immune from prosecution, efforts to hold officers accountable for past violations met with shows of strength. In Brazil, the self-granted amnesty of 1979 has never come close to being rolled back.

Just as Latin America's new democracies have basically safeguarded corporate military concerns, the broader political, economic, and social climate of the contemporary period does not threaten elite sectors that backed military activism in the past. Research suggests that only a small percentage of Brazilian industrialists feels threatened by the left in the new democratic regime, and that the overwhelming majority has adapted to the democratic system. Industrialists do not regard the military as necessary for protecting their interests on a regular basis and have responded to existing dissatisfaction by demanding greater participation in economic decisions. In fact, their significant economic power and ties to key decision makers have enabled business groups to exert more influence over economic policy making than any other single social group. International condemnation of military solutions in the post-cold war era—manifested, for example, in response to the attempted coup in Guatemala in 1993—doubtless contributes to the use of nonmilitary forms of influence on the part of Brazil's business elites.

In light of the current climate, the armed forces in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America have exercised notable restraint after retreating from power, save their uncompromising stance to preserve immunity from human rights prosecutions. The rigorous distance Brazil's military maintained from the investigations, demonstrations, and other events leading up to President Collor's impeachment was unprecedented in light of their interference in every other major political crisis of the twentieth century. Further testimony of change was the military's nonintervention during the lowest point of the Franco government, when widespread corruption, hyperinflation, and low morale among the ranks led many observers to draw parallels with the pre-1964 environment.

To return to the terms of the earlier discussion, despite the military's basic power capability, constraints on the leadership's willingness to use strong-arm tactics limit its influence over actual policy outcomes. Given the array of factors inhibiting the unleashing of force, coupled with the widespread perception that the military are reluctant to call upon their basic power capability, saber rattling has come to lack credibility. Military elites can bluff only so many times before civilians call their bluff. Armed forces that develop a reputation for making threats that are never carried out lose credibility over time. The practice of not taking military claims seriously remains more evident among legislators than presidents. At the risk of exaggeration, conditions of the 1980s and 1990s have rendered the Brazilian military somewhat of a paper tiger.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to address three questions posed at the outset: What is the impact of electoral competition on the political role of the military? How do specific political institutions condition the way in which civilians contest the military? How can the armed forces defend their claims? Contrary to the prevailing view that democracy in Brazil has remained and will remain restricted by virtue of the strong position the military enjoyed at the onset of democracy, my rational choice approach suggests that the installation of democratic competition tends to bring about a gradual expansion of popular sovereignty.

Using the strategic calculations of politicians as a point of departure, this chapter has argued that electoral competition and the incentives it unleashes form a key source of the dynamism that has marked civil-military relations in the postauthoritarian period. The policies that have resulted from these incentives have gradually shifted the balance of civil-military power in favor of civilians. This general trend of eroding military influence is subject to fluctuation depending on the strength of governments and the electoral relevance of issues. Politicians, both executive and congressional, are more likely to challenge the military under governments with widespread support and over issues where military interference threatens their own ability to win elections.

Specific institutional features condition the manner in which civilians contest the armed forces. How democratic competition works to alter the balance of civil-military power depends partly on politicians' strategies of reelection and on the institutional rules that govern these strategies. In a weakly institutionalized political system, as in Brazil, the feebleness of political parties induces politicians to attract voters through the constant provision of patronage and endorsement of popularity-enhancing platforms, practices that are likely to be at odds with military preferences. Such a system also sets the stage for the emergence of politicians who seek to enhance their political autonomy and therefore challenge tutelage by an independent and bureaucratic military.

But while the institutional characteristics of Brazil's political system reinforce the general incentives that electoral competition unleashes and provide special impetus for elected officials to challenge the armed forces, they militate against the development of conditions and measures conducive to ensuring long-term political stability and civilian control. Effective civilian governance, arguably the best antidote to the armed forces' intervention in politics, is more difficult to achieve in a weakly institutionalized party system. Moreover, given the potential of such a party system to produce high levels of politicization, institutionalized mechanisms to break the political role and autonomy of the military are less likely to be enacted and consistently observed by civilians.

The legitimacy and credibility of military force as a domestic political instrument also conditions the willingness of politicians to contest the armed forces. Widespread consensus in favor of democracy and the relative paucity of threats to the military's core political and corporate interests in the post-cold war era inhibit the armed forces as a whole from countering civilian efforts to downgrade their prerogatives by invoking coercion. The cost-benefit calculation made by military elites has generally pointed in favor of accepting their declining political fortunes rather than putting up resistance at the risk of provoking serious civil-military conflict. But simply because the military's actual bargaining power suffers serious limitations in the current period does not mean that the military cannot and do not extract occasional budgetary benefits or other concessions in exchange for supporting the government.

That civilians have contested and managed to reduce military influence in Brazil is especially noteworthy since the military entered the new democracy from a highly auspicious position. Chapter 2 analyzes why the officer corps enjoyed such strong standing in 1985. To explain this strength, the chapter goes back in time and analyzes developments that took place within the institution during the bureaucratic-authoritarian period, and between civilians and the military governments in the transition to democracy. By establishing where Brazil's armed forces stood in 1985, Chapter 2 offers a baseline from which to judge their post-1985 evolution.

Excerpted from Eroding Military Influence in Brazil—Politicians Against Soldiers by Wendy Hunter, The University of North Carolina Press, 1997, 244 pp.

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