Brazil's lack of training became apparent when the Brazilian soldiers
came under enemy fire. Instead of dispersing, so as not
to provide choice targets for German gunners, the Brazilians bunched
together. In one trench, 80 dead Brazilians were found, having
followed one after the other into the death trap.

John Roscoe

An international coalition to fight evildoers that threaten humanity? Would Brazil ever actively participate, actually send troops in such an endeavor? This is exactly what happened in 1943.

A student of mine, Ivo, is a historian. He's also a non-conformist, iconoclast, who seldom combs his hair. He is fond of wearing an old army field jacket that was actually his when he served in the Brazilian Army, almost 20 years ago. Nowadays, Ivo makes forays into the jungle to spend weeks at a time researching the native peoples of the Amazon.

We share an interest in history in general, and military history in specific. As an American male "baby-boomer" I can recite the names of all of the leaders of World War II, talk about the virtues of the P-51 Mustang fighter-bomber and discuss the battles of Iwo Jima, Anzio, and the Ardennes. It was the glory and the heroic, mythology brought home to us by our fathers that created legends and icons for our generation, which were only slightly dulled by the Viet Nam debacle.

In the last 38 years, I must have read hundreds of books regarding military subjects. I've visited war museums, played computer simulations of historical battles, and had my eyes filled with tears watching Saving Private Ryan. I even served in the army as a medic, although I only participated in the battles of Ft. Sam Houston, a medic training post in San Antonio, Texas.

Imagine my chagrin when Ivo brought up the subject of Brazil's second-world war combat in Europe.

Who? What? When? Where?

It briefly crossed my mind to ask "On which side?" but then again, the people of Brazil are hardly of a pure, Aryan-stock.

I was incredulous.

A few days later, Ivo put in my hands a battered, paperback copy of As Duas Faces da Gloria (The Two Faces of Glory) by Brazilian writer-historian, William Waack. It was accompanied by the warning, "Don't discuss this book with veterans or their families."

It is a fascinating work, and like all military history, it's about much more than the military.

In 1943, according to the comprehensive research done by Waack, President Franklin Roosevelt was already considering the New World Order that would emerge after the war was over. Brazil had suffered the sinking of some of its ships by German submarines, and was ready to enter the war against the Axis. Roosevelt proposed the formation of three modern and well-equipped, Brazilian infantry divisions. The prevailing Allied thinking was that this would enhance the image of a truly international coalition, even if the Brazilian forces were to be largely symbolic. Does this sound familiar?

General George Marshall thought the Brazilians could best be used to relieve and "free-up" higher quality troops that were occupying relatively tranquil sectors.

Brazil, notably not famous up until this date for having a stable democracy, had ulterior motives for participation. The Brazilian government was shrewd in the formation of its forces, with the common troops being recruited from the poorer, ethnically darker regions of the northeast, as compared to the more affluent, euro-centric south. Internal stability was more than a minor consideration at the time. Giving large formations of men guns had to be carefully thought-out.

For the officers, as for military officers throughout history, it was a chance to achieve personal glory and career advancement. The Brazilian military at the time reflected the state of the society. The officer-caste had a culture that was infused by political and family considerations, and that distanced itself from having any genuine concern about the welfare of their common soldiers that universally came from the poor classes.

In their military traditions, the Brazilians were fond of recalling the defeat of Paraguay that occurred shortly before the American Civil War, and the subsequent genocide that resulted. Paraguay with a fraction of the land area and population of Brazil finished the war with units of women and children utilizing spears and other hand weapons against the 19^th century rifles and cannons of Brazil. Since that time, the Brazilian military had been a force concerned only with maintaining Brazil's borders and keeping (or removing) the leadership in power. It had neither the experience nor technology for fielding an overseas, modern, combat force.

In 1944 the U.S. was an advanced, industrial power then at the height of its efficiency and productivity. Its relationship with Brazil reflected this disparity and other significant differences in mentality that still resonate today.

The sixty-year old correspondence and top-secret reports that are included in Waack's book, were circulated among the Allied commanders, and they reveal an interesting portrait of the Brazil that was emerging into modern society.

American officers—used to military discipline and regimen—were confounded by the fact that Brazilian officers seldom arrived at their duty stations before lunch. They encountered "amanhã-syndrome" when their Brazilian counterparts would routinely promise results for the following day, but instead offered polite excuses at the appointed hour. Many officers had never even inspected units that were under their command. The shining exception, to this overall disappointing image, were the Brazilian fighter pilots, whom were held in high esteem by the other allied forces. They were regarded as exceptional professionals, with great skill and courage.

Relegated to Italy

The 25,000 men of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, or the FEB (Força Expedicionária Brasileira) as it came to be known, were relegated to the campaign in Italy, which in 1944 was a distant-second priority in the war against Hitler.

The famed 101^st, and 82^nd Airborne Divisions were being dropped behind the lines in Normandy, and the "Big Red One" 1^st infantry Division was proving itself at Omaha Beach. Down the ramps of incredible ships rolled all the industrial might of the United States of America.

In Italy, a polyglot of New Zealander, Black-American, Japanese-American, Brazilian, Indian, South African and Australian troops were, among others, mired in a campaign to keep the Germans busy so they couldn't be used against the Normandy invasion. Artillery shells were rationed and fuel severely restricted.

Since landing in Italy, the situation had been far from pretty, and allied troops had suffered high-casualties, while making few gains. When the Americans mixed with the Brazilians who had come to relieve them, they knew exactly how second-priority the Italian battlefront was. Some of the Brazilians had been recruited one week before boarding the ship to Italy.

Almost none of them had any kind of tactical combat training, and very little target practice. Actually, training of any kind was not widespread among the common soldiers. Drivers had no idea how to function in convoys, or in many cases how to do simple maintenance—like water for radiators or oil for engines. Almost none of the infantrymen could use a compass. A soldier knows that in the dark, a single lit match can attract enemy fire from more than a mile away.

The Brazilian troops were fond of lighting bon fires and singing songs around them. Perhaps the one thing that did more to effect the opinion of other allied soldiers was the standard of hygiene employed by the Brazilian forces. Modern armies had learned over the years that large concentrations of troops often lost more men to disease, than to enemy action. It was observed that the Brazilians constructed very few latrines, and seldom used them. There was a concern about an epidemic occurring when the snow melted.

For their part, the Brazilians found the Americans rude, arrogant, and intolerant, with condescending attitudes. When American experts arrived to help in training the FEB, they were assigned to menial jobs and kept out of the way. When the Americans made a suggestion on how to do things the RIGHT WAY, the insulted Brazilian commanders would make certain to ignore the suggestion, regardless of its merits.

Brazilians accused the U.S. of unfair distribution of supplies, including food and ammunition. The Americans said that according to their records, the Brazilians had requisitioned 20 percent more than any other comparable unit in the area. The Americans refused to answer any more emergency requests for food or other supplies, until the Brazilians accounted for those that had already been sent. It was noted that the Italian senhoritas in the Brazilian sector were fashionably attired in American military clothing and dined on a regular diet of U.S. Army rations.

Although, hardly an uncommon occurrence in any American theater of war, the supply-situation in Italy forced severe restrictions and strict accountability measures. The logistical need of 25,000 people in a combat-zone, is more of a challenge than supporting the entire needs of a small-town. Small towns don't move around, and fight other small towns. The Brazilian supply-system was sending a bunch of guys to get some stuff.

The lack of initiative on the part of the Brazilian troops, and their complete lack of discipline or respect for their leaders caused serious worries for the allied commanders. The Americans thought the relationship between the Brazilian officers and their troops was bad, because the officers treated the troops so unjustly, without any concern for their welfare or dignity, as if they were sub-human. When a Brazilian soldier was issued a uniform—that was it—he wore it until it fell-off. Unlike other allied troops, the Brazilians weren't routinely provided with showers or changes of uniform.

Yet, in contrast, the Brazilians found American racism just as impressive any of their own practices, noting that US military units didn't even allow mixing of black and white troops at the time. The Japanese were likewise segregated.

Relations were at an all-time abysmal-low.

Ineffectual Army

The situation changed dramatically after the Brazilian troops were slaughtered in their first two failed attacks against German positions. Their lack of training became apparent when they came under enemy fire. Instead of dispersing, so as not to provide choice targets for German gunners, the Brazilians bunched together. In one trench, 80 dead Brazilians were found, having followed one after the other into the death trap. Artillery support was horribly ineffectual, without pre-planned fire missions or communications with frontline troops.

Brazilian barrages routinely missed their targets by a thousand yards or more. In some cases, the Brazilian troops broke and ran, but were unable to keep up with their officers who led the pack. German combat reports are generally precise and conservative. An official combat report of their battle against the Brazilians, described, "…great and bloody losses suffered by the enemy…" The disaster was complete, and a major investigation was launched to document the reasons. Instead of glory, the Brazilian career officers faced shame and potential court-martials.

After a top-secret report of the investigation was distributed among the Brazilians and the other allied forces, the Americans took over the training and coordination of the Brazilian unit, and this time cooperation on the part of the Brazilians was complete. Much of the training was conducted by the elite U.S. 10^th Mountain Division. The common Brazilian troops received the same treatment as the elite American troops, and responded with professionalism and enthusiasm. By the time the war finished the following year, the Brazilians had become as competent, organized and efficient as many of the units they served with.

How well organized and efficient? Well, it is interesting to note that 18 years after the war ended, the Brazilian military took over their country, and administered it for almost thirty years. Many of the major political players in Brazil, until recently, were veterans of the FEB in Italy. After they returned home with their stories of "what had happened over there", official Brazilian history told of how these men had brought home glory to their country.

John Roscoe is a Hawaiian-American living in Brasília. He studied journalism and communications at the University of Hawaii and has written, folksy, feature-stories for small island newspapers, as well as résumés for all of his friends. He currently works as an English teacher and can be contacted at johnthemedic@hotmail 

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